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Abstract. We analyze the effect of automation on economic growth and
inequality in an R&D-based growth model with two types of labor: high-
skilled labor that is complementary to machines and low-skilled labor
that is a substitute for machines. The model predicts that innovation-
driven growth leads to increasing automation, an increasing skill pre-
mium, an increasing population share of graduates, increasing income
and wealth inequality, a declining labor share, and (in an extension of
the basic model) increasing unemployment. In contrast to Piketty’s fa-
mous claim that faster economic growth reduces inequality, our theory
predicts that faster economic growth promotes inequality.
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1. Introduction
Common wisdom in growth and labor economics suggests that techno-
logical progress is labor-augmenting. Technological progress developed by
market R&D and incorporated in new machines is supposed to complement
human work effort and to make workers more productive (see, for example,
Jones, 2005). In this paper we look at the dark side of R&D-promoted
technological change. We consider the problem that new technologies com-
plement only some workers and render other workers redundant. Specif-
ically, we focus on technological progress understood as automation and
machines understood as robots and other devices that replace human la-
bor. This conforms with the very definition of automation as “automati-
cally controlled operation of an apparatus, process, or system by mechan-
ical or electronic devices that take the place [emphasis added] of human
labor” (Merriam-Webster, 2017). Examples for automation technologies
that have received prominent media coverage in the last few years include
industrial robots that are more and more able to replace human workers on
assembly lines; driverless cars, lorries, and delivery robots that could soon
transport goods and people between locations without the need for any hu-
man involvement; 3D printers that produce highly customized (and, thus,
previously very labor-intensive) products such as hearing aids, prostheses,
and even houses.1 As far as industrial robots are concerned, the Interna-
tional Federation of Robotics refers to them as “automated, programmable
and capable of movement on two or more axes. Typical applications of
robots include welding, painting, assembly, pick and place for printed cir-
cuit boards, packaging and labeling, palletizing, product inspection, and
testing; all accomplished with high endurance, speed, and precision” (IFR,
2015). In short, robots are built to replace human labor.
Since (at least at the current state of technology) high-skilled labor is
more difficult to automate than low-skilled labor, people may avoid the
perils of technological progress and enjoy its benefits by upgrading their
skills. We thus integrate an education decision into an R&D-based growth
theory with automation. We show that an increasing skill premium due
to automation motivates an increasing share of people to obtain higher
education (a college degree). However, in a heterogeneous society, not
1 See, for example, The Economist (2014, 2017), Abeliansky et al. (2015), The Guardian
(2015), and Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2016).
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all people are equally able to obtain higher education. Due to time (or
effort-) constraints, some individuals fail to acquire higher education and
are left behind. This way, R&D-based growth leads to increasing income
and wealth inequality and (in an extension of the model) to increasing
unemployment.
The phenomenon of large-scale automation in manufacturing is a rela-
tively recent phenomenon. The foundation of the first company to produce
industrial robots took place in the same year as Solow (1956) founded
neoclassical growth theory, which established as a key assumption that
technological progress complements human labor. But only after another
40 years, industrial robots production really took off. As shown in Figure
1, this take-off happened at around the same time when the “new growth
theory” of the 1990s endogenized technological progress, maintaining the
basic assumption that new machines are labor-augmenting (Romer, 1990;
Aghion and Howitt, 1992).
Similar to conventional R&D-based growth theory, we focus on the man-
ufacturing sector as the driver of TFP and income growth.2 We agree with
the earlier literature that the notion of labor-complementing technological
progress has been a reasonable assumption to describe the industrial past
until the 1990s. A picture of assembly line production in Henry Ford’s mo-
tor company could be a useful visual analogy. But the notion of across-the-
board labor-complementing technological progress seems to be less suited
to describe modern R&D-driven growth, where machines largely replaced
human labor in industrial production. Here, a picture of any modern car
factory could be a useful visual analogy (to see this, try “modern car fac-
tory” in google images). A future-oriented theory of R&D-based growth
should thus take into account that only some workers benefit from automa-
tion and new machines, while others are left behind.3
The idea of labor-complementing technological progress is maintained
in the (otherwise much related) literature on skill-biased technical change
(Acemoglu, 2002). The most popular discussion of skill-biased technolog-
ical progress is perhaps provided by Goldin and Katz (2009) who argue
2 We briefly comment on automation in the service sector in the Conclusion.
3 In this respect, the history of growth economics may appear reminiscent of Malthus’
(1798) “Principle of Population”, which provided a very detailed explanation of historical
developments but largely failed to describe future developments because, shortly after
its publication, the fertility transition set in.
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that America has lost the “Race between Education and Technology” be-
cause high-school completion rates stagnate since the 1950s. However, as
emphasized by Acemoglu and Autor (2009), this loss is of relative nature
because the underlying model assumes that unskilled labor also benefits
from innovations but “only” to a lower degree than skilled labor. Here,
by contrast, we conceptualize tertiary educated workers as high-skilled la-
bor (with a college degree), who are complements to machines and whose
wages continued to increase throughout the 20th century, and focus on low-
skilled workers as “absolute losers” of technological change in the form of
new machines because they are substitutes instead of complements.
The idea of labor-substituting technological progress, understood as au-
tomation, has been popularized by Brynjolfsson and McAfee’s (2011) book
on another race, the “Race against the Machine”. Our paper could be seen
as an attempt to formalize some core ideas of the book in the language of
growth economics. Specifically, Brynjolfsson and McAfee claim that recent
R&D-based innovations simultaneously boost the productivity of firms and
eliminate the need for many forms of human labor. Technological progress
as automation thus makes people more innovative, productive and richer
(as in the earlier new growth theories) but at the cost of increasing unem-
ployment and (wealth) inequality in society. Early quantitative evidence
for this view stems from Berman et al. (1998) who show that around 70
percent of the decline in production workers’ share in the wage bill can
be explained by R&D and computerization. More recently, Graetz and
Michaels (2016) provide evidence that industrial robots lead to a reduction
in the demand for low-skilled labor, Frey and Osborne (2013) show that,
while a large proportion of the U.S. labor force is susceptible to automation,
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the average educational attainment of an occupation and the probability
of this occupation to be automated are highly negatively correlated, and
Arntz et al. (2016) explain that low-skilled workers perform tasks that are
typically much easier to automate than the tasks performed by high-skilled
workers.4
Recently, a couple of theoretical papers investigated automation in the
context of long-run development. He´mous and Olsen (2016) and Acemoglu
and Restrepo (2016) are perhaps the most closely related ones. Like us,
both studies focus on R&D-based innovations and inequality in the process
of economic growth. In both studies the household side of the economy is
somewhat simpler since there is no education decision and skills are taken
as given for infinitely living individuals. The production side, however, is
more complex in both studies and differs crucially from ours. In both stud-
ies, R&D-based innovations play a more favorable role as in our theory.
Specifically, final goods are assumed to be produced by a variety of inter-
mediate goods (He´mous and Olsen) or a variety of tasks (Acemoglu and
Restrepo). Varieties are produced by labor and potentially by (low-skilled)
labor replacing machines. R&D generates new varieties which start out as
un-automated. The individual firms may then spend costly in-house effort
to automate the production of the variety supply. As a result, (low-skilled)
wages benefit from R&D-based innovations and are potentially harmed by
the in-house automation process. However, more productive automation
could be even good for (low-skilled) wages because it encourages more
R&D.
In our theory, R&D is conceptualized as the process that creates the very
machines that automate low-skilled labor in production. Maintaining the
image of the car factory created above, we assume that R&D produces new
machines (robots) that increase productivity and simultaneously substitute
low-skilled labor in car production. He´mous and Olsen and Acemoglu
and Restrepo assume that R&D creates new car parts or new tasks in
the production of cars, which start out un-automated and are potentially
later automated by in-house effort of the car part/task producing firm.
Acknowledging that it is plausible that R&D does both of these things,
our theory is complementing the existing literature. It provides a more
direct and less benign view on the role of R&D, which we think is more
4 See David (2015) and Eden and Gaggl (2016) for further evidence.
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appropriate to formalize Brynjolfsson and McAfee’s (2011) ideas on the
“Race against the Machine”.5
The interaction between technology, wages, and education relates our
paper to the unified growth literature, where one of the core mechanisms is
the rise of education triggered by technological progress (Galor and Weil,
2000; Galor and Moav, 2002; Galor, 2005; 2011). In contrast to this litera-
ture, we focus on tertiary education, R&D-based growth, and automation
through new technologies. In an earlier study (Strulik et al., 2013), we
constructed an overlapping generations version of the Romer (1990)–Jones
(1995) R&D-based growth model with an endogenous education and fer-
tility decision to discuss long-run adjustment processes. However, we did
not consider automation and the evolution of inequality.
Our paper also contributes to the long-standing debate on the interaction
between inequality and economic growth. While the earlier theoretical lit-
erature focused mainly on the causality running from inequality to growth
and empirical studies found a negative association (Persson and Tabellini,
1994; Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Aghion et al., 1999), the literature related
to skill-biased technical change (cited above) argues in favor of a causal-
ity running from growth to inequality and suggests a positive association.
Recently, Piketty (2014) has popularized the view that economic growth
reduces inequality in the context of the neoclassical growth model and a
stratified population. Here, we argue that R&D-based growth theory in
conjunction with automation provides a “non-Pikettarian” result: we show
that, ceteris paribus, faster growth is predicted to lead to more inequality in
labor income and wealth. This finding, however, does not imply that there
is no threat from automation when the growth rate of factor productiv-
ity declines. As long as R&D-based growth is positive, automation causes
inequality to rise. Along the transition we can then observe a negative as-
sociation between growth and inequality because growth is declining, while
inequality is on the rise. We show this outcome by simulating a calibration
of the model with U.S. data.
5 Other, for various reasons less related studies on automation and macroeconomic
performance are provided by Zeira (2010), Steigum (2011), Sachs and Kotlikoff (2012),
Benzell et al. (2015), Sachs et al. (2015), Abeliansky and Prettner (2017), Gasteiger and
Prettner (2017), and Prettner (2017). Most of these studies do not explain technological
progress endogenously. Exceptions are Zeira (2010) and Peretto and Seater (2013),
which, however, do not address inequality issues.
5
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we set up the ba-
sic model of R&D-driven automation. In Section 3 we take the education
system as given and provide a series of analytical results on growth and
various aspect of inequality (along the balanced growth path). The full
model with growth–education interaction can only be solved numerically,
which is what we do in Section 4. We discuss two alternative scenarios.
First, we follow the conventional approach in growth economics and cal-
ibrate an economy with positive long-run growth and increasing growth
along the (historical) adjustment path. Second, we consider an economy
where total factor productivity is gradually declining. This computational
experiment is important because it has been argued that automation should
be observed in conjunction with rising TFP growth such that there is lit-
tle threat from automation when actual TFP growth rates are declining.
We show that the model refutes this view. The key insight here is that
increasing automation and inequality require positive but not necessarily
increasing TFP growth. In Section 5 we augment the model by a social
welfare system and a labor supply decision and show how increasing au-
tomation can induce unemployment. Section 6 concludes.
2. The Model
2.1. Basic Assumptions. Consider an overlapping generations economy
in which individuals live for three time periods. In the first period of
their lives, individuals receive basic education and decide whether or not
to acquire higher skills. In the second period, workers supply labor on the
labor market and save for the third period, when they are retired. After
the third period, individuals die with certainty. According to the education
decision, there are two types of workers: i) c-types supply higher skills that
are difficult to automate. They are complements to machines. ii) s-types
supply lower skills that are easy to automate. They are substitutes for
machines. A helpful (non-necessary) interpretation would be that s-types
are individuals with high-school education or less. For simplicity, we ignore
low-skilled, non-routine jobs that are (yet) difficult to automate (see e.g.
Autor and Dorn, 2013) as well as the automation of some high-skilled
jobs by artificial intelligence. Including these features would provide more
realism of our stylized model but would not change the main mechanics
and the main results.
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There are three production factors, the two types of labor described
above and physical capital in the form of machines and robots. Workers
who are easy to automate can only be employed in the final goods sector for
tasks that can also be performed by machines. Workers who are difficult to
automate can be employed as workers in the final goods sector responsible
for tasks that cannot be easily automated (managers and engineers) or
as workers in the R&D sector for developing new technologies (scientists).
The split of complementary labor between the final goods sector and the
R&D sector is endogenous as in Romer (1990). Time t evolves discretely
with each time step capturing one generation. The working population is
of size Lt and grows at rate n ≥ 0.
2.2. Savings Decision. In the second period of their life, individuals earn
a wage income from (inelastic) labor supply and make a consumption-
savings decision. In period t, the remaining lifetime utility of working-age
individuals of type j = c, s is given by
ut = log(cj,t) + β log(R¯sj,t). (1)
in which cj,t is working-age consumption of the generation born at time t−1,
R¯ is the gross interest rate paid on savings carried over from the second
period of life to the third, and sj,t denotes savings such that cj,t+1 = R¯sj,t
refers to consumption in the third period of life. For simplicity we assume
that the economy is comparably small and open to international capital
flows such that the interest rate is determined at the world market. The
budget constraint that each individual j = c, s faces in the second period
of life is standard and given by
wj,t = cj,t + sj,t (2)
such that individuals can spend their wage income in the second period
(wj,t) on consumption in the second period or to build up assets by saving
to finance consumption in the third period. Maximizing utility (1) subject
to the budget constraint (2) leads to optimal consumption and optimal
savings as
cj,t =
wj,t
1 + β
, sj,t =
βwj,t
1 + β
, (3)
where β/(1 + β) is the savings rate of both types of workers.
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2.3. Education Decision. In the first period of their life, individuals do
not yet supply labor and receive consumption by their parents. In this
phase, they decide upon their education level. While everybody receives
a baseline education that allows for labor-market participation in general,
the decision of whether or not to acquire higher skills so as to become a
manager, an engineer or a scientist depends on the abilities of individuals
and the observed wage gap between low-skilled and high-skilled labor (for
a related skill-upgrading choice, see Cervellati and Sunde, 2005). Suppose
that learning ability is uniformly distributed in the interval (0, 1). Appar-
ently, not all members of society are willing and capable to obtain higher
education (a college degree). We model this feature conveniently be as-
suming that the time-cost (or effort) for higher education is a function of
ability and that exerting effort (losing leisure time) causes disutility.
Specifically, suppose education effort is given by e = ψ/a − θ such that
lima→0 e = ∞. Suppose young individuals have one unit of time at their
disposal and that disutility from effort is given by B log(1 − e). Individ-
uals fail to take up higher education if the disutility from exerting effort
exceeds the expected utility gain that higher education provides at work-
ing age and in retirement. From (1) and (2) we obtain indirect utility
ut = log[wj,t/(1+β)]+β log[R¯βwj,t/(1+β)] such that the utility gain from
higher education is (1 + β) log(wc,t/ws,t). Thus, individuals fail to take up
education if effort disutility is larger in absolute terms than the discounted
consumption utility gain, i.e., if
−B log(1− e) ≥ β(1 + β) log
(
wc,t
ws,t
)
.
Inserting ability-dependent effort and solving for ability, we obtain that
individuals fail to take up higher education if
a ≤ ψ
1 + θ − eβ(1+β)/Bw˜t ≡ f(w˜t), (4)
in which w˜t ≡ ws,t/wc,t is the relative wage of workers with lower educa-
tion and f(w˜t) is the ability threshold. The threshold is originating from
ψ/{1 + θ − exp [β(1 + β)/B]w˜t}, it is increasing and convex and exhibits
a pole where w˜t = (1 + θ) exp[−β(1 + β)/B]. To avoid unnecessary case
differentiation, we assume that the weight of effort B is such that we are
always to the left of the pole. Figure 1 displays the ability threshold. Recall
that ability is uniformly distributed in the interval (0, 1) to see that the
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population share of individuals with higher education is given by 1− f(w˜t)
if there is higher education. This means that, generally, the workforce with
higher education is given by
Lc,t = [1− f(w˜t)]Lt. (5)
Figure 1: The Education Threshold
a
0
f (w˜t)
w˜
1
ψ
1+θ
w˜t
f (w˜)
0
Individuals with ability a below the threshold f(w˜) re-
main without higher education. There are [1−f(w˜)]Lt
individuals with higher education.
Obviously, Ls,t = Lt − Lc,t = f(w˜t)Lt individuals remain without higher
education. Notice how the race between technology and education (Goldin
and Katz, 2009) is captured in Figure 1. With skill-biased technological
change, w˜, i.e., the inverse of the skill premium, gradually declines to zero.
This means that a larger population share of individuals is motivated to
take up higher education. Asymptotically, the society converges towards a
situation, where a population share of amin ≡ ψ/(1 + θ) remains without
higher education because their learning ability is too low to obtain a college
degree in finite time.
2.4. Population Growth. The evolution of the cohort size is governed
by the exogenous population growth rate n ≥ 0 and the workforce at time
t evolves as
Lt+1 = (1 + n)Lt.
In the basic model we abstract from unemployment such that Lt refers to
aggregate employment. In a growing economy, the threshold amin is reached
in finite time. From then onwards, the population shares `c,t = Lc,t/Lt and
`s,t = Ls,t/Lt stay constant and the economy potentially grows along a
balanced growth path (as discussed below).
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2.5. Final Goods Production. The production side of the economy builds
upon Romer (1990) and Jones (1995) whereby we distinguish between the
two cases by setting the parameters accordingly. Aggregate output is pro-
duced with physical capital in the form of machines and with both types
of labor according to the production function
Yt = L
1−α
c,Y,t
(
Lαs,t +
At∑
i=1
xαi,t
)
, (6)
where Lc,Y,t is the part of high-skilled labor that is employed in the final
goods sector, xi,t are machines of the specific type i, α ∈ (0, 1) denotes
the elasticity of output with respect to human labor that can easily be
automated, and At is the stock of specific blueprints available for the as-
sociated machines of type i, i.e., it represents the technological frontier of
the country under consideration. Technological progress is conceptualized
as increasing variety of machines in production. And the growth rate of A
is later associated with TFP growth.6
The factor rewards are
wc,Y,t = (1− α)L−αc,Y,t
(
Lαs,t +
At∑
i=1
xαi,t
)
⇔ wc,t = (1− α) Yt
Lc,Y,t
, (7)
ws,t = α(Lc,Y,t/Ls,t)
1−α, (8)
pi,t = αL
1−α
c,Y,tx
α−1
i,t , (9)
The key difference with respect to the related literature is that only the
marginal value product of type-c labor increases with the employment of
machines, while the marginal value product of type-s labor is unaffected
by machines. In other words, in contrast to earlier studies, we introduce
a type of labor, Ls, for which machines are a perfect substitute, which
conforms to the very definition of automation. This means that techno-
logical progress (TFP growth) has a fundamentally different impact on the
two types of labor. As commonly assumed, it increases the productivity of
complementing labor Lc and is in this sense quasi-labor augmenting. How-
ever, it leaves productivity of substitutable labor Ls unaffected such that
the relative importance of this type of labor declines with technological
progress.
6 Alternatively, we could have used a quality-ladder model (following Aghion and Howitt
(1992), which would be (in reduced-form) equivalent to the variety approach.
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2.6. R&D Sector. The R&D sector produces blueprints for new machines
At+1−At by employing scientists that are recruited from high-skilled labor.
The production function of the R&D sector is given by
At+1 − At = δ¯tLc,A,t,
where Lc,A,t denotes scientists employed in the R&D sector and δ¯ is the
productivity of these scientists. The productivity level of scientists it-
self depends on intertemporal knowledge spillovers (the standing-on-giants-
shoulders externality) and on congestion effects (the stepping-on-toes ex-
ternality) as described by Jones (1995). We follow the standard approach
and write
δ¯t =
δAφt
L1−λc,A,t
,
where φ ∈ (0, 1] measures the strength of intertemporal knowledge spillovers
and 1−λ with λ ∈ [0, 1] measures the strength of the congestion externality.
Notice that these parameter restrictions for φ and λ allow for the Romer
(1990) case of φ = λ = 1 and for the Jones (1995) case of φ, λ ∈ (0, 1).
Profits in the R&D sector are given by the revenue that R&D firms
generate by selling the patents they developed net of the costs for the
scientists that they employed,
pA,tδ¯tLc,A,t − wc,A,tLc,A,t, (10)
where pA,t is the price of blueprints and wc,A,t denotes the wage rate of
scientists. Due to the competitive labor market, the wage rate of scien-
tists attains the same level as the wage rate for type-c workers in the final
goods sector. R&D firms maximize profits by choosing optimal R&D em-
ployment, which provides the optimality condition wc,A,t = δ¯tpA,t. Our
overlapping generations structure allows us to introduce a finite patent
length of one generation, which is reasonably close to the actual patent
duration of approximately 20 years (United States Patent and Trademark
Office, 2017).
2.7. Intermediate Goods Sector. The intermediate goods sector uses
physical capital as variable input factor to produce machines. The pro-
duction function is linear with a unitary capital input coefficient such that
xi,t = ki,t, where ki,t is the amount of physical capital employed by each
11
intermediate goods producer. There are 2 types of intermediate goods pro-
ducers. Producers of the latest vintage of machines use a blueprint (patent)
from the R&D sector as fixed input. These firms have a certain degree of
market power and free entry into the intermediate goods sector implies that
operating profits in period t, pii,t, are equal to the entry costs consisting of
the price that has to be paid up-front for the blueprint such that
pii,t = pA,t. (11)
Producers of older vintages of machines are no longer protected by patent
law and free entry ensures that a zero profit condition holds. Henceforth
we index variables associated with the latest vintage of machines by i and
variables associated with earlier vintages by j. Operating profits for latest
vintage producers are given by
pii,t = pi,t(xi,t)xi,t − R¯xi,t. (12)
Profit maximization implies
p′i,t(xi,t)
xi,t
pi,t
+ 1 =
R¯
pi,t
⇒ pi,t = R¯
α
. (13)
Producers of the latest vintage of machines charge a markup over mar-
ginal cost and the production of machines of type i adjusts (due to capital
inflow/outflow) up to the point at which R¯ = α2L1−αc,Y,tx
α−1
i,t . Producers
of older vintages charge prices at marginal costs pj,t = R¯, for all j such
that the production of machines of type j adjusts (again due to capital
inflow/outflow) up to the point at which R¯ = αL1−αc,Y,tx
α−1
j,t . Combining both
demand functions provides the input ratio
xj,t = α
1
α−1xi,t. (14)
Demand for older vintages is higher because prices are lower. Aggregating
over all vintages and using (14) we obtain
At−1∑
j=1
xαj,t +
At∑
i=At−1
xαi,t = A˜tx
α
i,t, A˜t ≡
[
αα/(α−1) − 1]At−1 + At. (15)
Using the new notation, we can rewrite final goods production as Yt =
L1−αc,t [L
α
s,t + A˜tx(i)
α].
2.8. Equilibrium. Labor market clearing for high-skilled workers that are
complementary to machines implies that the total supply of type-c labor is
12
either employed in the final goods sector or in R&D such that
Lc,t = Lc,Y,t + Lc,A,t. (16)
The market-clearing wage rate is given by
wc,A,t = wc,Y,t ⇔ pA,t δA
φ
t
L1−λc,A,t
= (1− α)L
α
s,t + A˜tx
α
i,t
Lαc,Y,t
. (17)
From equation (9) we get demand
xi,t =
(
α
pi,t
) 1
1−α
Lc,Y,t. (18)
Plugging (18) and (11) into (17) provides profits of producers of the the
latest vintage of machines
pii,t =
δAφt
L1−λc,A,t
= (1− α)
Lαs,t + A˜t
(
α
pi,t
) α
1−α
Lαc,Y,t
Lαc,Y,t
. (19)
Using (13) we obtain profits as pii,t = (1 − α)R¯xi,t/α. Inserting this ex-
pression, the price pi,t = R¯/α, and Equations (18), and (16) into (19) we
obtain an implicit function for the employment level of scientists Lc,A,t. If
an interior solution with R&D exists, the employment level of scientists
solves the equation
R¯
α
(
α2
R¯
) 1
1−α
(Lc,t − Lc,A,t) δA
φ
t
L1−λc,A,t
=
(
Ls,t
Lc,t − Lc,A,t
)α
+ A˜t
(
α2
R¯
) α
1−α
. (20)
3. Analytical Results
The full model is recursive: young individuals need to form expectations
about future wages to determine their education and future wages in turn
depend on the education decision of the young. Thus, the full model is not
analytically accessible and we discuss the adjustment dynamics numerically
in Section 4. Here, we assume that the result of the education decision,
Lc,t, is given as a positive pre-determined state variable at any time t (im-
plying 0 < Ls,t < Lt). Notice, furthermore, that At (and thus A˜t) are
pre-determined state variables at time t such that solving for the equilib-
rium boils down to solving one equation, namely (20), for one unknown,
employment in R&D, Lc,A,t.
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3.1. Equilibrium R&D Employment. Inspection of (20) provides the
following result.
Proposition 1. At any time t the equilibrium employment level in the
R&D sector exists and it is positive and unique.
For the proof notice that, for the assumed positivity constraints on pa-
rameters and state variables R¯ > 0, δ > 0, φ ∈ (0, 1], α ∈ (0, 1), λ ∈ (0, 1),
At > 0, Ls,t > 0, and Lc,t > 0, the left-hand side (LHS) of Equation (20)
is strictly decreasing in Lc,A,t, while the right-hand side (RHS) is strictly
increasing in Lc,A,t. Furthermore, we have that
lim
Lc,A,t→0
LHS =∞, lim
Lc,A,t→0
RHS = const. > 0,
lim
Lc,A,t→Lc,t
LHS = 0, lim
Lc,A,t→Lc,t
RHS =∞.
As a consequence, there is a unique positive level of scientists in the R&D
sector. Once Lc,A,t has been found, we can solve for all other variables.
3.2. Balanced Growth Path. To establish balanced growth, we addi-
tionally assume that amin has been reached. In other words, we state the
common assumption that, along the balanced growth path, the population
shares of workers stay constant. We can distinguish between two central
cases, the Romer (1990) case with φ = 1 and n = 0 and the Jones (1995)
case with φ < 1 and n > 0. In the Romer (1990) case, since population
growth is zero, the growth rates of aggregate variables and the growth
rates of their per capita counterparts coincide. Denoting the growth rate
of variable x by gx we therefore have that, along the balanced growth path,
gC = gA = gY = gy with gy being the growth rate of per capita GDP
as given by gy = gA = δL
λ
c,A,t − 1. The long-run economic growth rate
rises if there are more scientists employed in R&D and if these scientists
have a higher productivity level (δ), and it decreases with the extent of the
duplication externality (1− λ).
In the Jones (1995) case with φ < 1 and n > 0 it follows that a balanced
growth path, along which the price for blueprints does not change and
the sectoral allocation of type-c workers between final goods production
and R&D is constant, is associated with a per capita growth rate of gy =
gA = (1 + n)
λ
1−φ − 1. As in the standard Jones (1995) case, the long-run
balanced growth rate of the economy increases with the population growth
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rate (n) and the extent of intertemporal knowledge spillovers (φ), whereas
it decreases with the extent of the duplication externality (1− λ).
3.3. Education and the Scale Effect. To analyze the impact of educa-
tion on R&D and economic growth we re-write (20) as the implicit function
F (Ls,t, Lc,A,t) =
R¯
α
(
α2
R¯
) 1
1−α
(Lc,t − Lc,A,t) δA
φ
t
L1−λc,A,t
−
(
Ls,t
Lc,t − Lc,A,t
)α
− A˜t
(
α2
R¯
) α
1−α
= 0. (21)
This leads to the following result.
Proposition 2. Consider two economies sharing the parameter values δ,
φ, α, and λ that face the same interest rate R¯ > 0, and the same initial
stock of blueprints for machines A(0). Then, the economy with more high
skilled workers allocates more workers to R&D.
Proof. Implicit differentiation of Equation (21) provides ∂F/∂Lc,t > 0 and
∂F/∂Lc,A,t < 0 and thus, by the implicit function theorem, dLc,A,t/dLc,t >
0. 
Proposition 2 implies that, in the Romer (1990) case of φ = 1 and n = 0,
the long-run growth rate of the economy with the larger amount of type-s
labor is lower. In the Jones (1995) case of φ < 1 and n > 0, the growth
rate of the economy with the larger amount of type-s labor is lower during
the transition phase but not in the long-run limit in which both economies
grow at the same rate.
These results shed new light on the old debate about the scale effect.7
To see this, recall from (5) that the size of the highly educated workforce is
7 A number of remedies have been brought forward in the literature for the counter-
factual prediction that larger countries grow faster than smaller ones. Jones (1995),
Kortum (1997), and Segerstrom (1999) argue that, with an increasing stock of knowl-
edge, it becomes more difficult to do the amount of R&D that is necessary to sustain a
given rate of technological progress; Peretto (1998), Young (1998), and Howitt (1999)
show that the product proliferation implied by horizontal innovation makes it harder to
keep the number of scientists for each product line constant and therefore it becomes
harder to foster vertical (quality-improving) innovation; Dalgaard and Kreiner (2001),
Strulik (2005), Strulik et al. (2013), and Prettner (2014) show that it is the aggregate
human capital stock that matters for long-run growth and not the sheer population size.
Under reasonable assumptions, an expansion in the number of people in an economy re-
duces the available resources for the education of each individual to such an extent that
the aggregate human capital stock declines, although the number of people increases.
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a compound of population size Lt and the population share that is highly
educated 1 − f(w˜). In particular, if the skill premium is low (w˜ is high)
or the education system is inefficient (captured by low ψ), it can easily be
that Lc is lower in a large less developed country than in a small advanced
country featuring a high skill premium and an efficient education system.
3.4. Inequality. Consider the wage rates for high-skilled type-c labor and
low-skilled type-s labor
wc,t = (1− α) Yt
Lc,Y,t
, ws,t = α
(
Lc,Y,t
Ls,t
)1−α
. (22)
Notice that type-c workers enjoy wage growth in case of a growing economy
(growing GDP Yt). By contrast, wages of low-skilled type-s workers are
constant on the balanced growth path, along which factor shares `c,t and
`c,Y,t are constant. Notice, in this context, that the stagnation of the wages
of low-skilled workers, irrespective of a growing overall economy and a
growth in the wages of high-skilled workers, is a phenomenon that has
been frequently bemoaned to prevail in the U.S. since the 1970s (Mishel
et al., 2015; Murray, 2016). Altogether, these results prove the following
proposition.
Proposition 3. In an economy populated by high-skilled type−c workers
that are complementary to machines and low-skilled type-s workers who are
substitutes to machines, higher growth implies higher wage inequality along
the balanced growth path.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. Technological progress
raises the productivity of high-skilled workers by the introduction of new
machines. At the same time, however, new machines do not raise the mar-
ginal value product of low-skilled workers because these workers are substi-
tutable by machines. Technological progress therefore increases the wage
premium enjoyed by type-c workers, which proves the next proposition.
Proposition 4. Technological progress is skill-biased.
Off the balanced growth path, a growing skill premium draws some in-
dividuals – with ability levels above amin but who chose to stay low-skilled
before the increase in the wage gap – into higher education to upgrade their
skills and to benefit from the growth in high-skilled wages. The rising rel-
ative supply of highly educated workers (rising Lc,Y,t/Ls,t), taken for itself,
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has a mitigating effect on the skill premium (as in the race between tech-
nology and education described by Goldin and Katz, 2009). Eventually,
with convergence towards the steady state, this inflow into type-c labor
ceases because individuals with ability below amin cannot upgrade their
skills. They have lost the race between technology and education. From
this point onward, the wage gap increases unchecked by supply. The higher
the rates of technological progress and economic growth, the faster the gap
between the wages of the two types of labor increases.
Another way to illustrate the disruptive effect of technological progress
on low-skilled workers is to consider the labor share in aggregate income
and to decompose it between high-skilled workers and low-skilled workers.
Proposition 5. Along the balanced growth path the total labor share is
declining towards (1− α). The low-skilled labor share is declining to zero.
For the proof we compute the labor share as
(1− α) + ws,tLs,t
Yt
, (23)
in which (1 − α) is the high-skilled labor share, and note that along the
balanced growth path Ls,t and ws,t are constant (since population shares
are constant), while Yt is growing at a positive rate.
The declining relative income of low-skilled labor has, furthermore, a
clear inequality-enhancing effect on the wealth distribution.
Proposition 6. In a growing economy, the share of wealth held by type-c
workers increases and converges to one asymptotically. Ceteris paribus,
faster economic growth leads to a faster increase of wealth inequality.
For the proof we insert wages (22) into savings (3) and obtain relative
wealth held by high-skilled workers s˜:
s˜ =
(1− α) Yt
Lc,Y,t
(1− α) Yt
Lc,Y,t
+ α
(
Lc,Y,t
Ls,t
)1−α
Ls,t
Lc,t
. (24)
Along the balanced growth path, the population shares stay constant, while
Yt/Lc,Y,t grows perpetually. This implies that the second term in the nu-
merator becomes gradually less important from a quantitative point of view
such that s˜ converges to 1. Clearly, wealth inequality increases faster when
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Yt grows at a higher rate. Notice that, off the steady state, rising higher ed-
ucation (declining Ls and increasing Lc) reinforces wealth inequality during
the transition towards the steady state.
In our stylized framework, rising wealth inequality is simply caused by
growing wages of type-c workers, stagnating wages of type-s workers, and
constant saving rates. In a less stylized framework, utility functions could
take into account subsistence needs or status concerns in consumption.
These mechanisms, however, would further amplify wealth inequality since
they imply lower saving rates for the poor. The result of Proposition 6 con-
trasts with the findings of Piketty (2014) who argues that, ceteris paribus,
a faster economic growth rate leads to a lower capital-output ratio and
that this in turn reduces inequality. With automation, by contrast, higher
growth implies a higher capital-output ratio along the transition towards
the steady state (where type-s labor play asymptotically no role).
4. The Race between Education and Technology
We next consider the adjustment dynamics off the steady state and the
interaction between education and technology. Qualitatively, it is straight-
forward to see the impact of technology on education.
Proposition 7. With technological progress, the share of high-skilled labor
in the population increases and converges towards ψ/(1 + θ).
The proof is obvious from Proposition 4 and inspection of Equation (5).
However, to fully assess the interactions in the race between education and
technology (Goldin and Katz, 2009), we need to solve the model numeri-
cally. We consider two different scenarios. In the first scenario we assume,
as usual in R&D-based growth theory, that the economy grows at a pos-
itive rate and converges gradually with initially low growth rates towards
the steady state. In the second scenario we consider the case of a secu-
lar decline in the growth rates of TFP and per capita GDP. This case is
less frequently discussed in the literature (exceptions are Jones, 2002, and
Groth et al., 2010). However, it is particular relevant in the present case
to address the question whether increasing automation is compatible with
declining productivity growth.
4.1. Positive Steady-State Growth. We start the computation of ad-
justment dynamics in the year 1900 and convert the predicted growth rates
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per generation into annual rates. Employing the argument of finite space
on earth, it can be argued that the only meaningful long-run steady state
is associated with a stationary population (Strulik, 2005) such that we as-
sume n = 0.8 A convenient population size is unity, since levels agree with
population shares, and we set L = 1. Furthermore, we normalize initial
A to unity. In order to have positive long-run growth, we need to impose
φ = 1 in this case. We set R¯ = 2 because, assuming that a generation lasts
for 25 years, this value corresponds to an annual real interest rate of around
3 percent. We assume that the time preference rate equals the interest rate
and set β = 1/R¯. Regarding the output elasticity of machines we assume
that α = 0.55 such that the long-run labor share is given by 0.45. We set
the technology parameters δ and λ and the education parameters φ and θ
such that the model predicts – for the end of the 20th century – an annual
TFP growth rate of around 1.5 percent per year, an R&D share of around
2 percent and that around 30 percent of the population have acquired a
college degree (which we associate with high skills). Finally, we adjust B to
ensure a solution to the left of the pole in Figure 1 for the entire adjustment
path. This leads to the estimates: λ = 0.3, δ = 1.6, ψ = 0.8, θ = 0.55, and
B = 3.
Solid lines in Figure 2 show the predicted adjustment dynamics. As
the economy grows and skill-biased technological progress unfolds (first
panel), more individuals are motivated to take up a college education (sec-
ond panel). The rising supply renders high skilled labor less scarce and
more high skilled labor is allocated to R&D (third panel). This in turn fur-
ther amplifies technological progress such that the economy takes off with
initially increasing growth rates. After a while, however, the stepping-on-
toes effect becomes noticeable and the gain in growth rates levels off as
the economy adjusts towards the steady state. The benefits of techno-
logical progress accrue exclusively to high-skilled labor which is, as usually
assumed in standard growth theory, a complement to (new) machines. Dur-
ing the transition, the wage rate of low-skilled labor increases somewhat due
to its declining supply such that steady state wages are around 1.4 times
higher then initial wages. However, for the aggregate low-skilled wage bill,
this effect is more than compensated by declining supply such that wsLs
8 See Strulik and Weisdorf for an R&D-based growth theory that generates this solution
endogenously
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declines mildly (at the steady state it is 7 percent below its initial value).
Compared to these minuscule changes, wages of high skilled labor increase
drastically in conjunction with TFP-growth. As a consequence, income
(and wealth) inequality increases as the economy converges towards the
steady state (bottom panel in Figure 2).
Figure 2: Adjustment Dynamics (φ = 1)
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Parameters: α = 0.55; β = 0.5; δ = 1.6, φ = 1, λ = 0.3, θ = 0.55, ψ = 0.8,
A(1) = 1, L = 1, B = 3.
In order to show our “non-Piketterian” result, we next increase δ to 2
(from 1.6) and keep all other parameters and initial values from the bench-
mark run. Results are shown by dashed lines in Figure 2. Due to the
assumed higher productivity in R&D, the alternative economy grows at a
higher rate, initially and everywhere along the adjustment path (panel 1).
The higher rate of skill-biased technological progress induces a faster growth
of income for the high-skilled population (panel 2), which provides more
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labor supply for R&D (panel 3), which further spurs innovation and eco-
nomic growth. Since low-skilled labor is not benefiting from these trends,
inequality increases faster than in the benchmark run (panel 4). Individ-
uals suffering from ability- (and thus time-) constraints in learning fail to
achieve college graduation and are left behind. They have lost the race
against technology.
4.2. Automation and Declining TFP Growth. The numerical exer-
cise of the previous section (in line with many related studies in quantita-
tive growth economics) predicts that TFP growth continued to grow in the
second half of the 20th century. Actually, however, TFP growth declined
mildly during this period. While this counter-factual prediction may be re-
garded as harmless in a different context, it is of particular importance for
the issue of automation because it has been argued that automation should
be observed in conjunction with rising TFP growth. For example, the New
York Times (20 February, 2017) argued in its editorial “No, Robots Aren’t
Killing the American Dream”:
And yet, the data indicate that today’s fear of robots is outpacing the
actual advance of robots. If automation were rapidly accelerating, labor
productivity and capital investment would also be surging as fewer workers
and more technology did the work. But labor productivity and capital in-
vestment have actually decelerated in the 2000s.
Likewise Jared Bernstein (2017) comments: “If automation were increas-
ingly displacing workers, we’d be seeing more output produced in fewer la-
bor hours, aka, faster productivity growth. But we see the opposite.” Here
we challenge the view that increasing automation is incompatible with de-
clining TFP growth and declining investment. In particular, we calibrate
the present model to fit falling TFP growth rates and falling investment
rates, and then show how increasing automation causes increasing inequal-
ity (this section) and increasing unemployment (next section). In an at-
tempt to improve on the last section’s calibration, we try to fit U.S. trends
for the second half of the 20th century (and beyond) for TFP growth (Fer-
nald, 2015), the population share with college degree (U.S. Census, 2015),
the Gini coefficient for before-tax monetary income (data from the U.S.
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Census, 2015; computation taken from Berruyer, 2012), the R&D expendi-
ture to GDP ratio (Ha and Howitt, 2007), and the investment rate (World
Bank, 2017). The parameters used in the calibration are provided below
Figure 3. The most notable change as compared to the previous exercise is
the estimate of φ = 0.7. A value of φ below unity is needed to fit a declining
TFP growth trend. It implies (slow) convergence towards a steady state
of zero exponential growth. We should say that we do not perform this
exercise because we endorse zero long-run growth in the distant future but
to focus on the implication of mildly declining TFP growth in the recent
history and the near future.
Figure 3: Adjustment Dynamics (φ < 1)
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Parameters: α = 0.51; β = 0.37; δ = 1.35, φ = 0.7, λ = 0.05, θ = −0.38, ψ = 0.35,
A(1) = 5, L = 1, B = 5.
Solid lines in Figure 3 show the predicted adjustment dynamics. Dashed
lines show the underlying data. The first panel shows that the calibration
supports a mildly falling trend of TFP growth and gets TFP growth in the
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late 20th and early 21st century about right. It also shows that decreasing
returns in learning from previous innovations (φ = 0.7) still supports 1
percent TFP growth at the end of the 21st century.
Although TFP is declining, all the previous mechanics of the model are
at work. The reason is, that they require only positive TFP growth but
not increasing or constant TFP growth. In the second panel we see how
the rising skill premium induces an increasing share of the population to
acquire higher education. The predicted increase in the share of graduates,
however, is slower than its rise in the data. This under-prediction may be
due to the primitive functional forms for utility and education (log-utility
does not provide much scope to manipulate the adjustment speed). It may
also indicate that the rise in college education could be caused by other
motives beyond the skill premium.
The middle panel in Figure 3 shows that the model gets the mildly ris-
ing trend in the R&D-share about right. The difference with respect to
the previous exercise is that the rising employment in R&D does not spur
further increases in the innovation rate and economic growth because it is
counter-balanced by decreasing returns in learning from previous innova-
tions.
The fourth panel shows that the model matches well the increasing trend
in inequality, which is predicted to rise further and to converge to 0.57
percent when the relative income and wealth of low-skilled individuals con-
verges to zero. The final panel in Figure 3 shows the investment rate,
computed as β/(1 + β)(ws,tLs,t + wc,tLc,t)/Yt. Since wc grows approxi-
mately with the rate of Y and ws is approximately constant over time, the
investment rate is mildly falling over time. The model’s prediction fits the
actual trend reasonably well.
The computational experiment clearly refutes the view that declining
productivity growth and declining investment are incompatible with in-
creasing automation and increasing inequality. As explained above, for
these trends to be simultaneously observed we only need positive TFP
growth, i.e., further innovation in automation. Increasing TFP growth or
increasing investment rates are not necessary for the dark side of R&D-
based innovation to materialize.
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5. Automation and Rising Unemployment
The model so far explains how automation renders low-skilled labor re-
dundant in the sense of “unnecessary” but not in the sense of “unem-
ployed”. Although their relative importance for production converges to
zero, low-skilled labor stays employed. To add more realism, we next intro-
duce unemployment caused by innovation and economic growth. In prin-
cipal, there are several gateways for rising unemployment. For example,
we could introduce status concerns into the utility function such that the
increasing wage gap to high-skilled labor reduces the value of labor income
for the poor, who would stop working for a wage considered to be inap-
propriate and disgraceful. Here, we follow the easiest road and introduce
unemployment via the social welfare system.
In order to simplify the analysis we assume (without loss of generality)
that unemployment occurs only among low-skilled individuals. For s-type
workers we now distinguish between workforce Ls and employment Es.
Suppose that social benefits for the unemployed are financed by a payroll
tax at constant rate τ and that the social welfare system runs a balanced
budget such that
τwc,tLc,t + τws,tEs,t = btws,t(Ls,t − Es,t). (25)
From (25) it follows that the replacement rate, denoted by bt, increases
over time because high-skilled wages are rising perpetually and low-skilled
wages are approximately constant. This induces an increasing share of
low-skilled workers to prefer unemployment.
To formalize this idea, we augment the utility function with individual-
specific disutility from work:
ut = log(c2,j,t) + β log(Rt+1sj,t) + ξΩω, (26)
in which ξ is an indicator function that assumes the value of 1 if working
and 0 otherwise; Ω is a constant weight for leisure, and ω is uniformly
distributed in the interval (0,1). Working individuals receive the net wage
(1− τ)wc,t and unemployed individuals receive social benefits btwc,t, where
bt is the replacement rate. By re-solving the optimization problem, we find
that individuals consume [ξ(1− τ) + (1− ξ)bt]wc,t/(1 + β) in working age
and [ξ(1− τ) + (1− ξ)bt]βR¯b˜twc,t/(1 + β) in old age. Individuals compare
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utility when working and not working and opt for not working if
ω ≥ − log
(
bt
1− τ
)
1 + β
Ω
≡ g(bt). (27)
Figure 4: The Unemployment Threshold
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1− τ
Individuals with disutility from work ω above the
threshold g(b) are unemployed.
The function g(b) provides the unemployment threshold. It is a positive
convex curve that intersects the b-axis at 1−τ , as shown in Figure 4. At any
given time and replacement rate bt, individuals with disutility from work
ω > g(bt) stay unemployed such that the unemployment rate is [1− g(bt)]
and there are Es,t = g(bt)Ls,t low-skilled workers employed. When the
replacement rate equals the net wage (1 − τ), all low-skilled individuals
stay unemployed.
We next run the model as calibrated in the last section (Figure 3) with
the unemployment extension. We set τ = 0.02 and Ω = 1.0 to match
a replacement rate of 52 percent (OECD, 2016; for a two earners couple
with two children) and an unemployment rate of around 8 percent in the
early 21st century. Results are shown by solid lines in Figure 5. The
most important takeaway is perhaps that the time paths in panels 1-4
are not discernibly different to the ones shown in Figure 3. Low-skilled
workers are indeed redundant with regard to the evolution of the rest of
the economy. The bottom panel shows the evolution of unemployment.
With rising wages of high-skilled workers, the replacement rate is gradually
rising (to 60 percent at the end of the 21 century) inducing an increasing
share of low-skilled workers to stay unemployed.
Finally, we return to the experiment of Figure 2 and consider an other-
wise identical economy that grows at a higher rate (by setting δ to 1.7).
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Results are depicted by dashed lines in Figure 5. They show that a falling
trend of TFP growth (and investment) does not invalidate the previous re-
sult that, ceteris paribus, higher growth is associated with higher inequal-
ity. Additionally, higher growth is associated with higher unemployment.
A higher rate of innovation in labor-saving technology and, thus, faster
wage growth of high-skilled labor induces more people who lost the race
against the machine to stay unemployed.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we proposed a new theory of endogenous technological
progress and economic growth according to which R&D-based innovations
in machine technology lead to more automation, a higher skill premium,
and more inequality in terms of income and wealth. The model predicts
Figure 5: Adjustment Dynamics (Unemployment)
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that more sophisticated technology induces more education but only to a
certain degree because, eventually, some individuals will be left who do
not manage to obtain higher education (a college degree) due to ability
constraints. This lost race against technology is reminiscent of Goldin and
Katz (2009) who focused on stagnating high school education since the
1950s. Some individuals are left behind, which creates rising inequality
because wages of other individuals – as commonly assumed in R&D-based
growth theory – increase at the rate of technological progress. Considering
the other big race mentioned in the Introduction, the model suggest that it
could be hard and eventually impossible to “run with the machine” instead
of against it (as suggested by Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2011). Compared
to the related literature, our theory has focused on the “dark side” of
R&D-driven technological change and has for that purpose made some
drastic assumptions on the substitutability of machines and labor, which
are, however, consistent with the definition of automation technology and
the common notion of robotics in the literature.
Similar to the related R&D-based growth literature, we focused on the
manufacturing sector, which leaves, in principle, the loophole that non-
routine, low-skilled labor finds employment in an expanding service sector.
However many tasks and jobs in services have a high potential for automa-
tion as well (Chui et al., 2016). Other non-routine jobs and tasks that
have been thought of as non-automatable in the not so distant past, such
as driving a cab in dense traffic, have already been automated success-
fully or may turn out to be automatable as technological progress proceeds
(Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2016). We thus expect that augmenting the
model by a service sector would lead to little more insights. A more serious
simplification is certainly the assumption that some (high-skilled) labor is
non-automatable. In future research, the model could be generalized by
assuming that more recent vintages of machines are able to substitute to a
larger degree for high-skilled labor.
According to our theory, it is misleading to believe that high economic
growth could be conducive to lower inequality (Piketty 2014). Yet, this
is not an anti-growth study. First, we argued that the basic mechanisms
are at play in an environment of declining growth as well. Second, higher
growth means more aggregate value added such that it becomes easier to
redistribute income from those who work at rising wages (or own robots)
27
to those left behind. In the unemployment section of the paper we showed
an example of such a mechanism by means of an increasing replacement
rate. The deeper question is perhaps whether we can envision a happy
“leisure society” (Keynes, 1930a, 1930b), in which robots and some high-
skilled workers produce almost all the value added and increasing parts of
the population are, from a production perspective, redundant.
28
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